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NOTES
PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND CAPITAL PUNISHENT
In 1960, petitioner Witherspoon was sentenced to death by
the jury that had convicted him of murder under statutory pro-
visions giving the jury the option of imposing capital punish-
ment or life imprisonment. Under applicable Illinois law, the
state was allowed to challenge for cause and to excuse prospec-
tive jurors who had scruples against capital punishment. On
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held it is unconsti-
tional to exclude persons with conscientious scruples against
capital punishment from juries which have the discretion to im-
pose capital punishment or a lesser sentence if guilt is found.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968). 1
Capital punishment was an established sentence for certain
serious crimes in England as early as 1500.2 At first the number
of crimes for which the ultimate penalty was prescribed was rel-
atively small, but the number grew much larger with the passage
of time. In 1825, death was the usual punishment for felonies in
England, which had 230 different capital crimes on its law
books.3 At this stage of criminal law development in England
and in the great majority of American jurisdictions, the death
penalty was mandatory if the accused were found guilty.4 There
was only a single question for the jury to determine-the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. The death penalty; if applicable
1. Fifteen separate trial errors urged by Witherspoon on appeal were rejected
by the Illinois Supreme Court and the conviction was affirmed on March 25,
1963. People v. Witherspoon, 27 Ill.2d 483, 199 N.E.2d 281 (1963). No mention
was made of any jury bias, although persons who acknowledged having "conscien-
tious or religious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty" had
been excluded from the jury by the state's challenge for cause, under the ap-
plicable Illinois statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959). Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 533 (1968). Further attacks on the conviction by habeas
corpus relief and statutory post-conviction remedy were likewise of no avail.
Witherspoon v. Ogilvie, 337 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 950
(1964).
2. By the year 1500, there were eight capital crimes recognized in English
law: treason, petty treason, murder, larceny, robbery, burglary, rape, and arson.
See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 1 (1964). See also generally T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 424-54 (5th ed. 1956).
3. H. Kalven & H. Ziesel, THE AMERICAN JuRY 434 (1966).
4. Id. This represented a legislative recognition that imposition of the death
penalty was too great a burden for a judge to bear alone. By making the sentence
follow a verdict of "guilty" without any further proof of any kind, legislatures
attempted to spread out the onus of capital punishment. But this effort eventually
backfired when juries simply refused to return "guilty" verdicts that would neces-
sarily result in capital punishment. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740,
753, 767 (1948), for a list of the responsive verdicts to the charge of murder
in each state.
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to the accused's crime, followed the verdict as a natural legal
concomitant, without regard to the feelings of judge or jury.
It was only a matter of time before the harshness of this
procedure caused modifications, since frequently a jury would
refuse to convict an obviously guilty defendant simply because
it did not wish to impose the death penalty.5 In an attempt,
therefore, to ensure more verdicts resulting in capital punish-
ment many jurisdictions separated the issues of guilt and sen-
tence.6 Juries were given two issues to decide in capital cases:
(1) is the accused guilty of the crime charged and (2) if he is
guilty, should capital punishment be inflicted? On the second
question, however, it should be noted that no standards were
given by which the jury was to decide whether the accused
deserved to live or should be condemned to die.
7
Even with the separation of the two issues, most states con-
tinued to permit challenges for cause as to those jurors opposed
to capital punishment or with scruples against its imposition s
This has also been the federal practice. 9
In Louisiana until 1846 crimes designated as capital carried
with them mandatory death sentences if guilt were found. 10 In
that year, a legislative act provided that jurors could add "with-
out capital punishment" to their "guilty" verdicts in capital
cases; but no criteria for determination of the question of life
or death were given. 1 By this legislation, the two issues of guilt
5. -I. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 434-35 (1966). See also
Grinnell, The Jury and Death Sentences, 31 MASS. L.Q. 60 (1946).
6. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 10 (1964).
7. See, for example, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2 (1968).
8. The notable exceptions are Iowa, State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 60 N.W. 119
(1894) and South Dakota, State v. Garrington, 11 S.W. 178, 76 N.W. 326
(1898).
9. See United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954). The court of
appeals in the Puff case ducked the issue of the justification of capital punishment
as not yet ripe for decision. The Witherspoon decision also failed to reach that
question directly, but the opinion shows that the degree of ripeness is clearly
greater in 1968 than it was in 1954.
10. It is interesting to note that the eminent civilian Edward Livingston in a
report to the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana spent some 40 pages
explaining why he had concluded "that the punishment of death should find no
place in the Code which you have directed me to present." (Emphasis added.) E.
LIVINGSTON, REPORT MADE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF LoU-
ISIANA ON THE PLAN OF A PENAL CODE FOP. THE SAID STATE 49 (1822). The
Code which he finally did present was so revolutionary, however, that the legislature
rejected this and other elements before accepting it.
11. Act of May 29, 1846, La. Acts 118 (1846). This provision has been re-
enacted in subsequent codes of criminal procedure in this state and is presently
listed as a responsive verdict in capital cases. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 814, 817.
In State v. Kennedy, 8 Rob. 590 (La. 1845), decided prior to the Act of May
29, 1846, the Supreme Court ruled that since the two issues of guilt and sentence
[Vol. XXIX
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and punishment were, in effect, separated. However, both issues
were settled by the jury in its verdict.
Soon after passage of the act, the Louisiana Supreme Court
ruled that the state could continue to challenge for cause jurors
who were opposed to or had scruples against capital punish-
ment.12 The court felt that the legislation now permitted a ver-
dict "in two forms" and if the jurors had scruples against either,
they could not "carry into effect the whole law" and they did not
"stand indifferent between the State and the accused." 13 The
opinion in that case has been followed without significant change
for over 100 years.'
4
Witherspoon urged two main grounds for denial of due pro-
cess in his petition to the United States Supreme Court. His
first contention was that exclusion of jurors who leaned toward
mercy in a capital case left his fate in the hands of cruel and
heartless extremists who would necessarily be prejudiced on the
issue of guilt. To support this position, he cited two unpublished
surveys and some interviews which he claimed tended to show
that jurors who felt no compunction about returning the death
penalty are naturally prosecution-prone.5 The Court rejected
this argument as presented, but it did not close the door com-
were merged, a juror partial on either element of the verdict could be challenged
for cause even in the absence of statutory provisions to that effect.
12. State v. Melvin, 11 La. Ann. 535 (1856).
13. Id. at 536.
14. State v. Stewart, 45 La. Ann. 1164, 14 So. 143 (1893) ;State v. Alphonse,
34 La. Ann. 9 (1882) ; State v. Baker, 30 La. Ann. 1134 (1878) ; State v. Ward,
14 La. Ann. 673 (1859); State v. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 570 (1859); State v.
Reeves, 11 La. Ann. 686 (1856) ; State v. Costello, 11 La. Ann. 283 (1856).
See also State v. Ricks, 242 La. 823, 138 So.2d 589 (1962); State v. Scott,
243 La. 1, 141 So.2d 389 (1962) ; State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947).
In State v. Henry, 197 La. 999, 3 So.2d 104 (1941), the corresponding prin-
ciple that the defendant is entitled to challenge for cause jurors who refuse
to return anything but the death penalty in a given case was recognized. That
principle has been reaffirmed in the recent cases of State v. Newton, 241 La.
261, 128 So.2d 651 (1961) and State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642, 80 So.2d 105
(1955).
The principle and the case were also cited approvingly in Winston v. United
States, 172 U.S. 303 (1898) ; People v. Sainz, 162 Cal. 242, 121 P. 924 (1912) ;
Demato v. People, 49 Colo. 147, 111 P. 704 (1910) ; Hill v. State, 42 Neb. 503,
60 N.W. 918 (1894) ; State v. Peltier, 21 N.D. 188, 129 N.W. 453 (1910);
Howell v. State, 102 Ohio 411, 131 N.E. 708 (1921) ; State v. Riley, 126 Wash.
256, 218 P. 241 (1923).
15. 391 U.S. 510, 517 n.10 (1968). The studies mentioned are F. GOLDBERG,
ATTITUDE TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BEHAVIOR AS A JUROR IN SIM-
ULATED CAPITAL CASES (Unpublished Manuscript, Morehouse College, undated);
W. WILSON, BELIEF IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND JURY PERFORMANCE (Un-
published Manuscript, University of Texas 1964). See generally Oberer, Does
Disqualifiction of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute
Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 545, 556-57 (1961).
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pletely to future claims of this nature which might be better
documented.16
The Court, through Mr. Justice Stewart, found greater merit
in Witherspoon's second contention that exclusion of persons
with scruples against capital punishment left the jury preju-
diced as to the punishment to be imposed. The Court held that
the jury that determined Witherspoon's punishment fell "woe-
fully short" of the requirement of an impartial jury,17 stating
"If the State had excluded only those prospective jurors who
stated in advance of trial that they would not even consider
returning a verdict of death, it could argue that the result-
ing jury was simply 'neutral' with respect to penalty. But
when it swept from the jury all who expressed conscientious
or religious scruples against capital punishment and all who
opposed it in principle, the State crossed the line of neu-
trality."1"
Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion emphasized that jurors are
given no rule or standard by which they are to judge between
life imprisonment and death. In the absence of a standard, the
jury is charged with expressing the feeling of the community
on this vital question. 19 The Court concluded that under such
circumstances, when the conscience of the community is to be
brought to bear on the issue, it is a denial of due process to ex-
clude any identifiable segment of that community.20 In this par-
ticular case, the exclusion of the segment of the community lean-
ing toward mercy left a jury which the Court felt could "speak
only for a distinct and dwindling minority. '21
16. 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968). The Court commented: "We simply cannot
conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial
notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an
unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk
of conviction. In light of the presently available information, we are not prepared
to announce a per se constitutional rule...." (Emphasis added.) See also id.
at 520 n.18 (1968).
17. Implicit in the Court's decision is a recognition of the application of the
"impartial jury" requirement of the sixth amendment to the states by the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. This application was decided in the recent case of
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
18. 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968). It could be argued that the Court has crossed
the line of neutrality by refusing to permit challenges for cause as to those
persons admittedly leaning away from the death penalty without any requirement
that they declare that they could lay aside their bias and render a verdict on the
evidence presented. Cf. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 797(2).
19. 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
20. Id. at 520.
21. Id. The Court also points out in a footnote that while the number of
persons under sentence of death has climbed in recent years, the number of
persons executed has fallen. Witherspoon's brief suggests that this may be due
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To exclude such persons, the Court felt, leaves the defendant
to face "a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death."22
Just as no accused can be tried on the issue of guilt before a
tribunal organized to convict,2 3 "no defendant can constitution-
ally be put to death at the hands of a tribunal so selected. ' '2 4
In a footnote, the Court clarifies the two types of challenges
for cause on this matter that remain for the state to exercise.
The state may challenge (1) those whose testimony on voir dire
makes it clear that they would automatically vote against the
death penalty regardless of the evidence adduced and (2) those
whose attitude toward the death penalty would prejudice them
on the issue of guilt, i.e., where the issue of guilt and punish-
ment are one.25 The decision does not affect the validity of any
sentence other than a capital sentence; and the decision does
not invalidate the conviction, as opposed to the sentence, in the
Witherspoon case or any other case.26 Finally, buried in a foot-
note, the Court announces that the decision is to be "fully retro-
active. ' 27
The actual holding in Witherspoon is quite narrow. Simply
stated, the decision holds that it is a denial of due process of law
to the defendant to exclude from the capital jury "the leaners,"
those with scruples against capital punishment.2 8 This appar-
to a divergence in the views of the juries selected and the views of society as a
whole. See id. at 521 n.1:9.
22. Id. at 521. This statement by the Court makes it clear that it agreed
with Witherspoon that persons with scruples against capital punishment may not
be challenged as prejudiced on the sentence question, although it would not take
the further step of declaring that jurors who would vote for the death penalty
are prejudiced as to guilt.
23. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1946). See also Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
24. 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1968). See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946); Thiel v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1P66) ; Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966); Schowgurow v.
State,; 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
25. 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21 (1968).
26. Id. But see Louisiana v. Turner, Docket no. 49,330 (Feb. 28, 1969).
27. Id. at 523 n.22 (1968). In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968), decided on the same day, the Court rejected an argument on challenges
for cause similar to Witherspoon's because the jury had in fact returned a verdict
of life imprisonment.
28. There is a paucity of examples in the jurisprudence of what the law
considers "scruples." The word itself is derived from the Latin word scrupulus,
meaning a small stone. But the word is used to mean "qualms" as well as "strong
moral or religious feelings inhibiting" a certain action. The Court apparently felt
that the Illinois jurisprudence defined "scruples" as "hesitation" to return a
capital verdict. The Court's citation, however, is to a case which states that those
who have scruples might hesitate to return a capital verdict. People v. Carpenter,
13 Ill.2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958). This is a truism which sheds no light
at all on the question of what "scruples" actually are. In Louisiana, scruples have
been termed a "mental obstacle" preventing an impartial discharge of duty.
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ently includes those who have "voiced general objection" to the
death penalty.2 9
The import of this decision may be much greater. One can
hardly deny that capital verdicts will now be difficult for the
state to achieve, if not impossible. Article 798(2) of the Louisi-
ana Code of Criminal Procedure has been severely limited by
Wtherspoon.30 The state may challenge for cause only those ju-
rors who will not render a capital verdict in any case, regardless
of the evidence presented. 1
The broad impact of the decision poses some interesting
questions for the state and for those sentenced to death and
awaiting execution. In the case of the latter, since the Court an-
nounces that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if jurors
with scruples against capital punishment were excluded from
the sentencing body,3 2 it would seem that each defendant who
can demonstrate such a procedure in his own case may effective-
ly reduce his sentence to life imprisonment under federal habeas
corpus relief. Since our commutation and parole statutes envi-
sion jury-imposed sentences, a question may arise whether pris-
oners who have their sentences reduced under the Witherspoon
rationale are then eligible for commutation or parole.3 3
State v. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 570, 571 (1859). There are very few other defini-
tions. But definitions are largely of academic interest only, for now only the
extremists in either direction are excluded from the jury; the "leaners," however
one defines that term, may stay.
29. The Court does not discuss the implied corollary to the decision : that the
defendant may no longer challenge for cause those who lean away from a qualified
verdict. In Louisiana, the defendant's right to such challenges was upheld in
State v. Henry, 196 La. 218, 233, 198 So. 910, 915 (1940). It is not clear whether
the defendant's challenges on this issue are swept away along with the state's.
In any case, the defendant and the state retain the general power to challenge
for cause. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 797(2): "The state or the defendant may
challenge a juror for cause on the ground that: .... (2) The juror is not im-
partial, whatever the cause of his partiality." Here the defendant must demonstrate
more than an opinion or impression of the juror; it must be shown to the court's
satisfaction that the juror cannot render an impartial verdict according to the law
and the evidence before he may be excused.
30. LA. CODE CRIAM. P. art. 798(2) : "It is good cause for challenge on the
part of the state, but not on the part of the defendant, that:
"(2) the juror tendered in a capital case has conscientious scruples against the
infliction of capital punishment .. " In response to Witherspoon, the Louisiana
legislature has now amended id. art. 798(2), permitting challenges only as those
persons mentioned as able to be challenged by the court. See La. Acts 1968 (E.S.)
No. 31, § 1.
31. The state may continue to challenge by peremptory challenges jurors
which it finds unacceptable, but in capital cases only twelve such challenges are
permitted for each defendant. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 799. The Supreme Court
of the United States has recently reiterated that it will not inquire into the
reasons for a peremptory challenge. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
32. 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968).
33. LA. R.S. 15:571.7 (1950) provides: "Whenever a prisoner who has
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The state is not completely without recourse after Wither-
spoon. The lack of adequate standards by which the jurors are
to judge whether a man should live or die appears to be a major
reason for the decision. 34 The state could attempt to define
through legislation the factors to be taken into account by the
jurors in deciding the question of punishment." In practically
every other instance, the law prescribes a fairly definite penalty
to be imposed if guilt is found. Establishment of standards for
punishment would eliminate the broad, free discretion of jurors
in sentencing which was a principal factor in Witherspoon.6
The state might also return to its former procedure and pro-
vide mandatory capital punishment if guilt is found, thus tak-
ing the sentencing burden from the jury entirely. By once again
merging the issues of guilt and capital punishment, the state
should be able to challenge those jurors whose scruples on the
punishment issue would prevent them from rendering an impar-
tial decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. As noted
been convicted of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment for life, so conducts
himself as to merit the approval of the superintendent of the state penitentiary he
may apply for a commutation of his sentence and the application, upon approval
of the superintendent, shall be forwarded to the governor. The governor may
commute the sentence upon the recommendation in writing of the lieutenant
governor, attorney general, and presiding judge of the court before which the
conviction was had or any two of them. No commutation under the provisions of
this Section shall reduce the period of incarceration to less than ten years and
six months." Id. 15:574.3 further provides: "No parole shall be granted to any
prisoner serving a life sentence until after his life sentence has been commuted to
a fixed term of years by action of the state board of pardons and the Governor,
and until the prisoner has served at least one-third of the time fixed by the com-
mutation of sentence." This question may be largely academic, however, because
it is unlikely that the governor would commute the sentences of men formerly
awaiting execution.
34. 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968). This is aptly demonstrated in the Court's
comment that "one of the most important functions any jury can perform... is
to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system-
a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)."
35. The jury might be instructed that death would be a proper verdict after
taking into account some of the following circumstances: (1) Is the defendant
a multiple offender? (2) Was the crime committed "with treachery, taking ad-
vantage of superior strength, with aid or armed men"? (3) Was the crime com-
mitted for a price or reward? (4) Was the crime committed in such a way
(explosion) that the lives of many others might have been endangered as well?
(5) Was the crime committed with evident premeditation? (6) Was the crime
committed with cruelty, "by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering
of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse? (7) Is the
defendant a person whose life could be improved by proper treatment during con-
finement?" Some of these standards are actually in use for judges in the Philippine
Islands. See PHILIPPINE REV. PENAL CODE art. 248.
36. Other statutes with broad discretion and no standards may also come
under attack after Witherspoon, even though it is the judge rather than the jury
who has the sentencing power. For example, LA. R.S. 14:31 (1950) prescribes a
penalty of not more than twenty-one years for manslaughter without giving any
standards :by which the decision is to be made.
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earlier, Witherspoon is said not to affect this type of challenge
for cause. The possibility of lesser included offenses as respon-
sive verdicts lessens the probability of a jury's returning a ver-
dict of "innocent" to avoid imposing death sentences in capital
cases. 37 But as an added safeguard against compromise acquit-
tals, the state could limit the number of capital crimes, confining
them to those in which the majority of the population would feel
that the death penalty is necessary or desirable. To this end, the
felony-murder provision might be deleted ;3s jurors would almost
certainly balk at the idea of mandatory capital punishment in
all felony-murder cases as a result of "guilty" verdicts. The
state might also re-examine the mandatory capital punishment
provisions in aggravated rape cases. 39 Consideration could also
be given to eliminating the death penalty which may be imposed
if a person over twenty-one is convicted of selling or giving a
marijuana cigarette to a minor. 40 In short, if the state still de-
sires the death penalty as punishment for certain aggravated
crimes, it should be careful to limit those crimes to ones which,
in the community opinion, clearly deserve the supreme punish-
ment.
41
The decision in Witherspoon is obviously a momentous one
for defendants, but it is also very important for the state. The
effect of the decision should be to force states to re-assess their
own position toward the death penalty. The Court has put the
burden on the states to re-examine carefully their procedures if
they wish to retain capital punishment. 42 The tone of Wither-
37. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 814.
38. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950). For an extreme example of the application of the
doctrine, see Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955), where
the court held that the killing of a co-felon by the robbery victim was attributable
to the surviving felon.
39. LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950). The present penalty for rape may actually en-
courage murder of the victim. Since the offender will get death for his act if
convicted of aggravated rape, he has nothing to lose by killing the victim; and
he could eliminate the key witness in the process.
40. Id. 40:981, 40:961.
41. The state might leave murder of a policeman as the only capital crime,
as some states have done. Still others have included murder by a person already
serving life imprisonment for another crime. See, for example, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.30 (McKinney 1967), which permits the imposition of the death penalty
only in these two instances and if the defendant is over the age of eighteen at
the time of the crime.
42. It appears that the Court may be reacting to current social opinion
on the matter of capital punishment. In a footnote, the Court cites a public
opinion poll showing 47% of persons interviewed opposed to capital punishment
while 42% favored capital punishment in proper cases and 11% were undecided.
391 U.S. 510, 520 n.16 (1968). See also H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 194-213, 231-58 (1964).
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spoon indicates, however, that the time may not be too far dis-
tant when the Court will strike down capital punishment as a
penalty for crime altogether. 43
H. Alston Johnson III
GUILTY PLEAS, JURY TRIAL, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT-
The Effects of United States v. Jackson
An indictment charging defendants with violation of the
Federal Kidnapping Act1 was dismissed by the United States
District Court 2 which held the entire statute unconstitutional be-
cause it authorized only the jury to impose capital punishment.3
The principal grounds for the ruling was that the defendant was
required to expose himself to "the risk of death" in order to gain
jury trial. The United States Supreme Court on direct appeal,
agreeing with the district court on the basic constitutional ques-
tion, reversed on the issue of severability 4 and held the death
penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act is invalid be-
cause it places an impermissible burden-"the risk of death"-
upon the exercise of the fifth amendment right not to plead
guilty and the sixth amendment right to jury trial. United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
Jackson is examined here, not because of the specific and
rather narrow holding relative to the Federal Kidnapping Act,
but rather to present and evaluate the reasoning of the court
43. Recent decisions show that the Court tends to regard capital punishment
as suspect, and shows increasing concern about procedure when a man's life hangs
in the balance. In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Court
held the death penalty could not be imposed on a defendant who had to subject
himself to the risk of capital punishment in order to get a jury trial. Had he
waived the jury trial, the maximum penalty permitted under the applicable
statute was life imprisonment. In a related case, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled
that a statute permitting the death penalty to be imposed only by the jury
constituted a lop-sided constitutional scheme which could not be justified. Spillers
v. State, 436 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1968).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1958). The charge was that defendants had trans-
ported across state lines a person who had been kidnapped, held for ransom, and
harmed when liberated.
2. United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967).
3. The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1958), provides:
"Whoever knowingly transports in interstate ... commerce, any person who has
been unlawfully ... kidnapped and held for ransom ... or otherwise ... shall be
punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed,
and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed." (Emphasis added.)
4. The Supreme Court found the death penalty provision a "functionally in-
dependent" part of the statute and held the unconstitutionality of the death
penalty provision did not defeat the validity of the remaining provision.
